In this work we consider the communication of information in the presence of an online adversarial jammer. In the setting under study, a sender wishes to communicate a message to a receiver by transmitting a codeword x = (x1, . . . , xn) symbol-by-symbol over a communication channel. The adversarial jammer can view the transmitted symbols xi one at a time, and can change up to a p-fraction of them. However, for each symbol xi the jammer's decision on whether to corrupt it or not (and on how to change it) must depend only on xj for j ≤ i. This is in contrast to the "classical" adversarial jammer which may base its decisions on its complete knowledge of x. More generally, for a delay parameter d ∈ (0, 1), we study the scenario in which the jammer's decision on the corruption of xi must depend solely on xj for j ≤ i − dn.
Abstract-In this work we consider the communication of information in the presence of an online adversarial jammer. In the setting under study, a sender wishes to communicate a message to a receiver by transmitting a codeword x = (x1, . . . , xn) symbol-by-symbol over a communication channel. The adversarial jammer can view the transmitted symbols xi one at a time, and can change up to a p-fraction of them. However, for each symbol xi the jammer's decision on whether to corrupt it or not (and on how to change it) must depend only on xj for j ≤ i. This is in contrast to the "classical" adversarial jammer which may base its decisions on its complete knowledge of x. More generally, for a delay parameter d ∈ (0, 1), we study the scenario in which the jammer's decision on the corruption of xi must depend solely on xj for j ≤ i − dn.
In this work, the transmitted symbols are assumed to be over a sufficiently large field F. We present a tight characterization of the amount of information one can transmit in both the 0delay and, more generally, the d-delay online setting. We show that for 0-delay adversaries, the achievable rate asymptotically equals that of the classical adversarial model. For positive values of d, we consider two types of jamming, additive and overwrite. We also extend our results to a jam-or-listen online model, where the online adversary can either jam a symbol or eavesdrop on it.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following adversarial communication scenario. A sender Alice wishes to transmit a message u to a receiver Bob. To do so, Alice encodes u into a codeword x and transmits it over a channel. In this work the codeword x = x 1 , . . . , x n is considered to be a vector of length n over an alphabet F q of size q. However, Calvin, a malicious adversary, can observe x and corrupt up to a p-fraction of the n transmitted symbols (i.e., pn symbols).
In the classical adversarial channel model, e.g., [9] , [3] , it is usually assumed that Calvin has full knowledge of the entire codeword x, and based on this knowledge (together with the knowledge of the code shared by Alice and Bob) Calvin can maliciously plan what error to impose on x. We refer to such an adversary as an omniscient adversary. For large values of q (which is the focus of this work) communication in the presence of an omniscient adversary is well-understood. It is 0 B. K. Dey is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai, India, 400 076, email: bikash@ee.iitb.ac.in, S. Jaggi is with the Department of Information Engineering, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong, email: jaggi@ie.cuhk.edu.hk, M. Langberg is with the Computer Science Division, Open University of Israel, 108 Ravutski St., Raanana 43107, Israel, email: mikel@openu.ac.il The work of B. K. Dey was supported in part by Bharti Centre for Communication in IIT Bombay, the work of S. Jaggi was supported by CERG grant 2150581 and the CUHK MoE-Microsoft Key Laboratory of Human-centric Computing and Interface Technologies, and the work of M. Langberg was supported in part by ISF grant 480/08. known that Alice can transmit no more than (1 − 2p)n errorfree symbols to Bob when using codewords of block length n. Further, efficient schemes such as Reed-Solomon codes [13] , [1] are known to achieve this optimal rate. a) Online adversaries: In this work we address the analysis of coding schemes that allow communication against certain adversaries that are weaker than the omniscient adversary. We consider adversaries that behave in an online or causal manner. Namely, for each symbol x i , we assume that Calvin decides whether to change it or not (and if so, how to change it) based on the symbols x j , for j ≤ i alone, i.e., the symbols that he has already observed. In this case we refer to Calvin as an online adversary.
Online adversaries arise naturally in practical settings, where adversaries typically have no a priori knowledge of Alice's message u. In such cases they must simultaneously learn u based on Alice's transmissions, and jam the corresponding codeword x accordingly. This causality assumption is reasonable for many communication channels, both wired and wireless, where Calvin is not co-located with Alice. For example consider the scenario in which the transmission of x = x 1 , . . . , x n is done during n channel uses over time, where at time i the symbol (or packet) x i is transmitted over the channel. Calvin can only corrupt a packet when it is transmitted (and thus its error is based on its view so far). To decode the transmitted message, Bob waits until all the packets have arrived. As in the omniscient model, Calvin is restricted in the number of packets pn he can corrupt. This might be because of limited processing power or limited transmit energy.
In addition to the online adversaries described above, we also consider the more general scenario in which Calvin's jamming decisions are delayed. That is, for a delay parameter d ∈ (0, 1), Calvin's decision on the corruption of x i must depend solely on x j for j ≤ i − dn. We refer to such adversaries as d-delay online adversaries. Such d-delay online adversaries correspond, for example, to the scenario in which the error transmission of the adversary is delayed due to certain computational tasks that the adversary needs to perform. We show that the 0-delay model (i.e., d = 0) and the d-delay model for d > 0 display different behaviour, hence we treat them separately. b) Error model: We consider two types of attacks by Calvin. An additive attack is one in which Calvin can add pn error symbols e i to Alice's transmitted symbols x i . Thus y i , the i'th symbol Bob receives, equals x i + e i . Here addition is defined over the finite field F q with q elements. An overwrite attack is one in which Calvin overwrites pn of Alice's trans-mitted symbols x i by the symbols y i received by Bob 1 . These two attacks are significantly different, if we assume that at the time Calvin is corrupting x i he has no knowledge of its value -this is exactly the positive-delay d scenario.
The two attacks we study are intended to model different physical models of Calvin's jamming. For instance, in wired packet-based channels Calvin can directly replace some transmitted packets x i with some fake packets y i , and therefore behave like an overwriting adversary. On the other hand in wireless networks, Bob's received signal is usually a function of both x i and the additive error e i .
Lastly we consider the jam-or-listen online adversary. In this scenario, in addition to being an online adversary, if Calvin jams a symbol x i then he has no idea what value it takes. This model is again motivated by wireless transmissions, where a node can typically either transmit or receive, but not both. For this model, we consider all four combinations of 0-delay/ddelay, and additive/overwrite errors.
Roughly speaking, a rate R is said to be achievable against an adversary Calvin if it is possible for Alice to transmit a message u of at least Rn symbols of F q over n channel uses to Bob (with probability of decoding error going to zero as n → ∞). The capacity, when communicating in the presence of a certain adversarial model, is defined to be the supremum of all achievable rates. Thus, the capacity characterizes the rate achievable in the adversarial model under study. We denote the capacity of the classical omniscient adversarial channel which can change pn characters by C omni (p). We denote the capacity of the d-delay online adversarial channels which can change pn characters by C add d (p) for the additive error model, and C ow d (p) for the overwrite error model. For the jam-or-listen adversary, we denote the corresponding capacities by C jl,add d (p) or C jl,ow d (p), depending on whether Calvin uses additive or overwrite errors. We would like to note that it is crucial for our proofs that Alice's encoders are probabilistic, i.e., depend on private randomness that is available to neither Bob nor Calvin. A detailed discussion of our definitions and notation is given in Section II. Related work: In this work, we study of codes for online adversaries, and present a tight characterization of the amount of information one can transmit in both the 0-delay and, more generally, the d-delay online setting. To the best of our knowledge, communication in the presence of an online adversary (with or without delay) has only been addressed in a recent work of ours [8] on binary online channels. Nevertheless, we note that the model of online channels, being a natural one, has been "on the table" for several decades and the analysis of the online channel model appears as an open question in the book of Csiszár and Korner [5] (in the section addressing Arbitrary Varying Channels [2] ). Various variants of causal adversaries have been addressed in the past, for instance [2] , [7] , [15] , [16] , [12] -however the models 1 Note that in the 0-delay case these two attacks are equivalent. This is because in both cases Calvin can change an x i into an arbitrary y i ; an additive Calvin can choose e i = y i − x i , whereas an overwriting Calvin directly uses y i . considered therein differ significantly from ours. There is also some work in literature pertaining to wireless communications in the presence of jammers [14] , however, the details of those models also differ significantly from those considered in this work.
As mentioned above, in a recent work of ours [8] we study the 0-delay binary additive (and thus also overwrite) channel capacity and present certain upper bounds on its value. The proof techniques used in [8] along with its results differ substantially from the work at hand. A recent work [4] considers d-delay additive adversaries for the extreme value of d = 1 in the context of secret sharing schemes and fuzzy extractors. Although the motivation and context of [4] differ substantially from ours, their proof techniques (based on certain authentication schemes) bear some resemblance with ours. This work: At a high level, we show in this work that for 0-delay adversaries over large alphabets, the achievable rate equals that of the classical "omniscient" adversarial model. This may at first come as a surprise, as the online adversary is weaker than the omniscient one, and hence one may suspect that it allows a higher rate of communication. We then show, for positive values of the delay parameter d, that the achievable rate can be significantly greater than those achievable against omniscient adversaries.
We stress that our results do not assume any computational limitations on the adversarial jammer Calvin. The codes we construct to achieve the optimal rates are computationally efficient to design, encode and decode. All our results assume that the field size q is significantly larger than n. In some cases it suffices to take q = poly(n), but in others we need q = exp(poly(n)). Both settings lend themselves naturally to real-world scenarios, as in both cases a field element x i can be represented by a polynomial (in n) number of bits.
The exact statements of our results are in Theorems 1, 2, 3 and 4 below. The technical parameters (including rate, field size, error probability, and time complexity) of our results are summarized in Table IV of the Appendix. We start by showing that in the 0-delay case, the capacity of the online channel equals that of the stronger omniscient channel model.
Theorem 1 (0-delay model): For any p ∈ [0, 1], communicating against a 0-delay online adversary channel under both the overwrite and additive error models equals the capacity under the omniscient model. In particular, C ow 0 (p), C add 0 (p) and C omni (p) all equal
Moreover, the capacity can be attained by an efficient encoding and decoding scheme.
Next we characterize the capacity of the d-delay online channel under the additive error model. Theorem 2 (d delay with additive error model): For any p ∈ [0, 1] the capacity C add d (p) of the d-delay online channel for d > 0 under the additive error model is 1 − p. Moreover, the capacity can be attained by an efficient encoding and decoding scheme.
We then turn to study the d-delay online channel under the overwrite error model. The capacity we present is at least as large as that achievable against an additive or overwrite 0-delay adversary who changes pn symbols. However, it is sometimes significantly lower than that achievable against an additive d-delay adversary.
Theorem 3 (d delay with overwrite error model): For any p ∈ [0, 1] the capacity of the d-delay online channel under the overwrite error model is
. (2) Moreover, the capacity can be attained by an efficient encoding and decoding scheme. Lastly, we show that the optimal rates achievable against a jam-or-listen online adversary equal the corresponding optimal rates achievable against an online adversary, for each of the four combinations of 0or d-delay, and additive or overwrite attacks.
Theorem 4 (jam-or-listen model): For any p and d in [0, 1] the capacity of the d-delay online channel under the jam-or-listen error model is equal to that of the d-delay online channel:
Moreover, the capacity can be attained by the same efficient encoding and decoding schemes as in Theorems 1, 2 and 3. The proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 are given in Sections III and IV respectively. Since Theorem 1 follows from Theorem 3 as a special case, we omit its proof. The proof of Theorem 4 follows from the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 and is also omitted.
II. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
For clarity of presentation we repeat and formalize the definitions presented earlier. Let q be a power of some prime integer, and let F q be the field of size q. Throughout this work we assume that q is exponential in poly(n) (although some of our results will only need a poly(n) sized q) and that our parameters p and d are constant. For any integer i let [i] denote the set {1, . . . , i}. Let R ≥ 0 be Alice's rate. An [n, Rn]-code C is defined by Alice's encoder and Bob's corresponding decoder, as below.
Alice: Alice's message u is assumed to be a random variable U with entropy Rn log q bits over alphabet U. Throughout this work we will consider two types of encoding schemes for Alice: "uniform" and "general". In both cases, Alice will also hold a uniformly distributed secret r which is assumed to be a number of elements (say ) of [q]. Alice's secret is assumed to be unknown to both Bob and Calvin prior to transmission. For uniform codes, Alice's message u is assumed to be uniformly distributed over U = [q Rn ]. Alice's encoder is a deterministic function mapping every (u, r) in [q nR ] × [q] to a vector x = (x 1 , . . . x n ). For general codes, Alice's message u is assumed to be governed by an arbitrary random variable U . As before, Alice's encoder is a deterministic function mapping every (u, r) in U × [q] to a vector x = (x 1 , . . . x n ).
Calvin/Channel: We assume that Calvin is online, namely at the time that the character x i is transmitted Calvin has the knowledge of {x i } i∈Ki . Here the knowledge set K i is a subset of [i] that is defined below according to the different jamming models we study. Using his jamming function Calvin either replaces Alice's transmitted symbol x i in F q with a corresponding symbol y i , or adds an error e i to x i such that Bob receives
In this work, Calvin's knowledge sets must satisfy the following constraints. Causality/d-delay: Calvin's knowledge set K i is a subset of [i − dn]. Jam-or-listen: If Calvin is a jam-or-listen adversary, K i is inductively defined so that it does not contain j ≤ i such that y j = x j . That is, Calvin has no knowledge of any x i he corrupts.
Calvin's jamming function must satisfy the following constraints. For each i, Calvin's jamming function, and in particular the corresponding error symbol e i ∈ F q , depends solely on the set {x i } i∈Ki , Alice's encoding scheme, and Bob's decoding scheme. Additive/Overwrite: If Calvin is an additive adversary, y i = x i +e i , with addition defined over F q . If Calvin is an overwrite adversary, y i = e i . Power: Bob's received symbol y i differs from Alice's transmitted symbol x i for at most pn locations i.
Bob: Bob's decoder is a (potentially) probabilistic function solely of Alice's encoder and the received vector y. It maps every vector y = (y 1 , . . . y n ) in F n to an element u of U.
Code parameters: Bob is said to make a decoding error if the message he decodes u differs from that encoded by Alice, u. The probability of error for a given message u is defined as the probability, over Alice's encoder, Alice's secret r, Calvin's randomness, and Bob's randomness, that Bob decodes incorrectly. The probability of error of the coding scheme is defined as the maximum over all u of the probability of error for message u. 2 Note that these definitions imply that a successful decoding scheme allows a worst case promise. Namely, it implies high success probability no matter which message u was chosen by Alice.
The rate R is said to be achievable if for every ε > 0, δ > 0 and every sufficiently large n there exists a computationally efficient [n, n(R − δ)] q -code that allows communication with probability of error at most ε (here q may depend on the block size n). The supremum of the achievable rates is called the capacity and is denoted by C. We denote the capacity of the ddelay online adversarial channels under the additive error model by C add d (p) and under the overwrite error model by C ow d (p). For a jam-or-listen adversary we denote the corresponding capacities by C jl,add d (p) and C jl,add d (p). We put no computational restrictions on Calvin. This is because our proofs are information-theoretic in nature, and are valid even for a computationally unbounded adversary. However, our schemes provide computationally efficient schemes for Alice and Bob.
Packets: For several of our code constructions (specifically those in Theorems 2 and 3), it is conceptually and notationally convenient to view each symbol from F q as a "packet" of symbols from a smaller finite field F q of size q instead. In particular, we assume (q ) m = q. Here m is an integer codedesign parameter to be specified later. For a codeword x = x 1 , . . . , x n , Alice treats each symbol (or packet)
Similarly, she treats her secret r as m sub-symbols r 1 through r m from F q .
A few remarks are in place. In the upcoming sections, to simplify our presentation, we prove our theorems assuming Alice uses a uniform encoder. For the uniform case one may assume that U = [q Rn ]. In the Conclusions section of this work we show how our proof extends to the case of general encoders. Secondly, we note that we can allow Calvin to be even stronger than outlined in the model above.
In particular, Calvin's jamming function can also depend on Alice's message u, and our Theorems and corresponding proofs remain unchanged. The crucial requirement is that each of Calvin's jamming functions be independent of Alice's secret r, conditioned on the symbols in the corresponding knowledge set. That is, the only information Calvin has of Alice's secret, he gleans by observing x.
III. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We consider block length n large enough so that d > 1/n. Throughout, to simplify our presentation, we assume that expressions such as pn or dn are integers. We first prove that C add d (p) ≤ 1 − p by showing a "random-add" strategy for Calvin. Namely, suppose calvin chooses elements of F q uniformly at random and adds them to the first pn transmitted symbols. Thus the first pn received symbols are i.i.d. uniform from F q , and carry no information. It can be verified that such an adversarial strategy allows communication between Alice and Bob at rate at most 1 − p. This proves the upper bound.
We now describe how Alice and Bob achieve a rate approaching 1 − p with computationally tractable codes. Alice will use a uniform encoding scheme. Alice's encoding is in two phases. First, roughly speaking, she uses an erasure code to encode the approximately (1 − p)n symbols of her message u into an erasure-codeword v with n symbols. The erasure code allows u to be retrieved from any subset of at least (1 − p)n symbols of the erasure-codeword v. Next, Alice uses n "short" random keys and corresponding hash functions to transform each symbol v i of the erasure-codeword v into the corresponding transmitted symbol x i . This hash function is carefully constructed so that if Calvin corrupts a symbol x i , with high probability Bob is able to detect this in a computationally efficient manner by examining the corresponding received y i . Bob's decoding scheme is also a two-phase process. In the first phase he uses the hash scheme described above to discard the symbols he detects Calvin has corrupted -there are at most pn such symbols. In the second phase Bob uses the remaining (1 − p)n symbols and the decoder of Alice's erasure code to retrieve her message. We assume Alice's erasure code is efficiently encodable and decodable (for instance Reed-Solomon codes [13] , [1] can be used). In what follows we give our code construction in detail.
Let q be sufficiently large (to be specified explicitly later in the proof). Let m = n 2 + 2n. As mentioned in Section II, Alice treats each symbol of a codeword x = x 1 , . . . , x n as a packet, by breaking each x i into m sub-symbols x i,1 through x i,m from F q . She partitions x i,1 through x i,m into three consecutive sequences of sub-symbols of sizes n 2 , n and n respectively. The sub-symbols x i,1 through x i,n 2 are denoted by the set w i , and correspond to the sub-symbols of v i , the ith symbol of the erasure-codeword v generated by Alice. The next n sub-symbols are denoted by the set r i , and consist of Alice's secret for packet i, namely, n sub-symbols chosen independently and uniformly at random from F q . For each i, r i is chosen independently. The final n sub-symbols are denoted by the set σ i , and consist of the hash (or signature) of the information w i by the function H ri . Here, H ri is taken from a family H of hash functions (known to all parties in advance) to be defined shortly 3 . All in all, each transmitted symbol x i of Alice consists of the tuple (w i , r i , H ri (w i )).
We now explicitly demonstrate the construction of each w i from Alice's message u. Alice chooses R = (1−2n/m)(1−p). Thus the message u she wishes to transmit to Bob has mnR = (m − 2n)(1 − p)n = (1 − p)n 3 sub-symbols over F q . Alice uses an erasure code (resilient to pn 3 erasures) to transform these sub-symbols of u into the vector v comprising of n 3 subsymbols over F q . She then denotes consecutive blocks of n 2 sub-symbols of v by the corresponding w i 's. More specifically, w i consists of the sub-symbols in v in locations n 2 (i − 1) through n 2 i − 1.
Before completing the description of Alice's encoder by describing the hash family H, we outline Bob's decoder. Bob first authenticates each received symbol y i = (w i , r i , σ i ) by checking that H r i (w i ) = σ i . He then decodes using the decoding algorithm of the erasure code on the sub-symbols on w i of all symbols y i that pass Bob's authentication test.
We now define our hash family H and show that with high probability any corrupted symbol y i = x i will not pass Bob's authentication check. More specifically, we study only corrupted symbols y i = x i for which w i = w i . (If w i = w i , the erasure decoder described above will not make an error.) Let e i be the error imposed by Calvin in the transmission of the i'th packet x i . Hence for an additive adversary Calvin, e i is defined by y i = x i + e i . Analogously to the corresponding sub-divisions of x i and y i , we decompose e i into the tuple (ŵ i ,r i ,σ i ). In particular, we define the setsŵ i ,r i andσ i so to satisfy w i = w i +ŵ i , r i = r i +r i and σ i = σ i +σ i . For Bob to decode correctly, the property that y i fails Bob's authentication test ifŵ i = 0 needs to be satisfied with high probability. More formally, noting that r i is not known to Calvin and thus independent ofŵ i , we need for all i and all e i such thatŵ i = 0, that
To complete our proof we present our hash family H. Recall that w i consists of n 2 sub-symbols in F q . Let W i represent w i when arranged as a n × n matrix. Let r i be a column vector of n symbols corresponding to r i . We define the value of the hash H ri (w i ) as the length-n column vector σ i defined as W i r i . Thus for the corresponding errorsŵ i = 0,r i ,σ i defined above,
For Calvin to corrupt Alice's transmission, we assume that w i = 0 or equivalentlyŴ i = 0, therefore the rank ofŴ i is at least 1. Now, inŴ i r i =σ i − (W i +Ŵ i )r i , the left hand side depends on r i while the right hand side does not. Hence the equation is satisfied by at most (q ) n−1 values for the vector r i . Since r i is uniformly distributed over (F q ) n and unknown to Calvin, the probability of a decoding error is at most 1/q = o(n −1 ) if q is chosen to be n · ω (1) .
All in all, our communication scheme succeeds if each corrupted symbol withŵ i = 0 fails the authentication test. This happens with probability at least 1 − n/q = 1 − o(1) as desired. Taking m = n 2 + 2n the rate of the code is (1 − o(1))(1 − p) and the field size needed is (q ) m = exp(poly(n)).
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof of Upper bound: As mentioned previously, our proof assumes Alice uses a uniform encoder (and thus U = [q Rn ]). In the Conclusion section of this work we show how our proof extends to the case of general encoders. We start by addressing the three cases in the upper bound on the capacity C ow d (p). First, if p < d, Calvin corrupts the first pn symbols uniformly at random as in the proof of Theorem 2 to attain an upper bound of 1 − p on the achievable rate. Second, if p ≥ 1/2 and the rate R > 0 is positive, Calvin picks a codeword x uniformly at random from Alice's codebook. With probability at least 1 − q −Rn , the message corresponding to x is distinct from that corresponding to x. Calvin then randomly picks either the first half or the second half of x and replaces it by the corresponding symbols of x . If indeed x = x , Bob has no way of determining whether Alice transmitted x or x . Thus, Bob's probability of decoding incorrectly is at least
for large enough q and/or n.
Finally, if d < p < 1/2, we present a "wait-and-attack" strategy for Calvin to prove that C omni
Suppose not, and that rate R = 1 − 2p + d + ε is achievable for some ε > 0. There are q Rn possible messages in Alice's codebook. Calvin eavesdrops, without corrupting, the first (R−ε)n symbols Alice transmits. He then overwrites the next dn symbols with symbols chosen uniformly at random from F q . These dn locations convey no information to Bob. At this point (after Alice transmits (R+d−ε)n symbols), the d-delay Calvin only knows the value of the first (R−ε)n symbols of x. It can be verified that with probability at least 1 − q −εn/2 over Alice's codebook, after Alice's first (R + d − ε)n transmitted symbols, the set S of messages corresponding to codewords consistent with what Bob and Calvin have observed thus far is of size at least q εn/2 . Calvin then picks a random message from S and an arbitrary corresponding codeword x . With probability at least 1−q −εn/2 , the message corresponding to x is distinct from that corresponding to x. Calvin then randomly picks either the first half or the second half of the remaining (1−(R+d−ε))n = 2(p−d)n symbols of x and replaces it by the corresponding symbols of x . If indeed x = x , Bob has no way of determining whether Alice transmitted x or x . Thus Bob's probability (over the message set and over the choice of Calvin) of decoding incorrectly is at least 1 2 (1−q −εn/2 ) 2 ≥ 1 4 . More formally, by Bayes' Theorem [6] , if Bob receives y, the a posteri probability that Alice transmitted x, denoted p(x|y), equals p(y|x)p(x)/p(y). Here p(x) is the probability (over her encoding strategy) that Alice transmits x, p(y|x) is the probability (over Calvin's random strategy) that Bob receives y given that Alice transmits x, and p(y) is the resulting probability that Bob receives y. Similarly, p(x |y) = p(y|x )p(x )/p(y). Taking the ratio and noting that for uniform encoders codes p(x) = p(x ), we have p(x|y)/p(x |y) = p(y|x)/p(y|x ).
(4)
The probabilities p(y|x) and p(y|x ) are equal. This observation and (4) together imply p(x|y) = p(x |y). Thus, Bob cannot distinguish whether x or x were transmitted. Namely, on the pair of events in which Alice transmits x and Calvin chooses x and in which Alice transmits x and Calvin chooses x, no matter which decoding process Bob uses, he will have an average decoding error of at least 1/2. Using an averaging argument, this also implies a maximum error and suffices to prove our assertion.
Proof of Lower bound: We now prove the achievability of the rate C ow d (p) specified in Theorem 3 with a computationally tractable code. The scheme we present covers all positive rates in the rate-region specified in Theorem 3. Our scheme follows roughly the ideas that appear in the scheme of Section III. Namely, Alice will use a uniform encoding scheme comprising of an erasure code along with a hash function used for authentication. However, in general, an overwrite adversary is more powerful than an additive adversary, because it can be directly shown that an overwriting adversary can substitute any symbol x i by a new symbol y i that can pass the authentication scheme used by Bob in Section III.
We thus propose a more elaborate authentication scheme in which each symbol x i contains information that allows for pairwise authentication with every other symbol x j .
Using notation similar to that of Section III, let u be the message Alice would like to transmit to Bob, and v = v i , . . . , v n be the encoding of u via an efficiently encodable and decodable erasure code (here we use Reed-Solomon codes). Let q be sufficiently large (to be specified explicitly later in the proof). Let m = n 4 + 2n 3 (note that this is significantly larger than in Theorem 2). As mentioned in Section II, Alice treats each symbol of a codeword x = x 1 , . . . , x n as a packet, by breaking each x i into m sub-symbols x i,1 through x i,m from F q . She partitions x i,1 through x i,m into three consecutive sequences of sub-symbols of sizes n 4 , n 3 and n 3 respectively. The sub-symbols x i,1 through x i,n 4 are denoted by the set w i , and correspond to the sub-symbols of v i , the ith symbol of the erasure-codeword v generated by Alice. The next n 3 sub-symbols are arranged into n sets of n 2 sub-symbols each, denoted by the sets r ij for each j ∈ [n], and consist of Alice's secret for packet i. That is, each r ij consists of n 2 sub-symbols chosen independently and uniformly at random from F q . For each i and j, r ij is chosen independently. The final n 3 sub-symbols arranged into n sets of n 2 sub-symbols each, denoted by the sets σ ij for each j ∈ [n], and consist of the pairwise hashes of the symbols x i and x j . We define σ ij to be H rij (w j ), where H rij is taken from (a slight variation to) a pairwise independent family H (known in advance to all parties). Namely, σ ij is the hash of the information from x j using a key from the transmitted symbol x i . All in all, each transmitted symbol x i of Alice consists of the tuple (w i , (r ij ) j∈[n] , (H rij (w j )) j∈[n] ).
We now explicitly demonstrate the construction of each w i from Alice's message u. Alice chooses R = (1 − (2n 3 )/m)C, where C is an abbreviation of the capacity C ow d (p) specified in Theorem 3. Note that R equals C asymptotically in n. Thus the message u she wishes to transmit to Bob has mRn = (m − 2n 3 )Cn = Cn 5 sub-symbols over F q . Alice uses an erasure code (resilient to (1 − C)n 5 erasures) to transform these sub-symbols of u into the vector v comprising of n 5 sub-symbols over F q . She then denotes consecutive blocks of n 4 sub-symbols of v by corresponding w i 's. More specifically, w i consists of the sub-symbols in v in locations n 4 (i − 1) + 1 through n 4 i. Here i = 1, . . . , n.
In the remainder of the proof, we first discuss the property of the family H of hash functions in use, needed for our analysis, and then describe and analyze Bob's decoding algorithm.
As mentioned above we use a (variation to a) pairwise independent hash family H = {H r } with the property that for all w j = w j , the probability over r ij that H rij (w j ) = H rij (w j ) is sufficiently small. Such functions are common in the literature (e.g., see [11] , [10] ). In fact, we use essentially the same hashes as in Theorem 2, except with different inputs and dimension. Namely, let W i and W i represent w i and w i respectively arranged as n 2 × n 2 matrices. Let r ij be a lengthn 2 column vector of symbols corresponding to r ij . We define the hash H rij (w j ) as the column vector σ ij = W i r ij . Note that H rij (w j ) = H rij (w j ) implies W j r ij = W j r ij , which implies that (W j − W j )r ij = 0. But by assumption w j = w j , so W j = W j , and so W j − W j is of rank ≥ 1. Thus a random r ij satisfies (W j − W j )r ij = 0 with probability ≤ 1/q .
We now define Bob's decoder. Let x i , x j be two symbols transmitted by Alice, and y i , y j be the corresponding symbols received by Bob. Consider the information w i , the secret r ij and the hash value σ ij in x i , and let w i , r ij and σ ij be the corresponding (potentially corrupted) values in y i . Similarly consider the components of x j and y j . Bob checks for mutual consistency between y i and y j . Namely, the pair y i and y j are said to be mutually consistent if both σ ij = H r ij (w j ) and σ ji = H r ji (w i ). Clearly, if both y i and y j are uncorrupted versions of x i and x j respectively, they are mutually consistent. By the analysis above of H rij , if Calvin does not know the value of r ij , does not corrupt x i but corrupts w j , then the probability over r ij that y i and y j are consistent is at most 1/q . This is because σ ij = σ ij = H rij (w j ), r ij = r ij , and w.h.p. H rij (w j ) = H rij (w j ). We conclude:
Lemma 4.1: With probability at least 1−1/q , the following y i and y j are mutually inconsistent. (i) Causality: If i > j, x i = y i and w j = w j . (ii) d-delay: If |i − j| < dn, and Calvin corrupts exactly one of the symbols x i and x j so that either w i = w i or w j = w j .
Bob decodes via the d-Delay Online Overwriting Disruptive Adversary Decoding (d-DOODAD) Algorithm, described in detail below. We first give a high-level overview of the three major steps of d-DOODAD. Bob's first step is to test pairs of received symbols (y i , y j ) for mutual consistency. In particular he considers only pairs of symbols separated by at most dn locations; in this event Lemma 4.1(ii) implies that Bob detects the corruption of exactly one of a pair of symbols with high probability.
Based on the O(dn 2 ) tests in the first step, in the second step he enumerates subsets of {y 1 , . . . , y n } of received symbols as "candidate subsets" for decoding via Alice's erasure code. In particular, each of the candidate subsets satisfies the natural property that it contains at least (1 − p)n mutually consistent y i 's. Naïvely, this enumeration seems computationally intractable since there may be as many as n (1−p)n such sets. However, there is also a more intricate combinatorial property (Step 2(c) in the d-DOODAD algorithm below) that candidate subsets must satisfy; we discuss this property after presenting the details of the algorithm. The effect of Step 2 is to drastically curtail the number of candidate subsets that Bob needs to consider, to at most n p/d , to make it computationally tractable. (In the special case that p < d, it can be directly verified that in fact Bob only needs to consider a single subset of size (1 − p)n. If p > d, and in particular if p/d is large, the structure of candidate sets seems intrinsically more complex, and an enumeration of the type we propose seems necessary to deal with all possible adversarial actions.)
In the third step, for each of the candidate subsets generated in the previous step, Bob uses the decoder for Alice's erasure code to generate a set of linear equations that the sub-symbols of her message u must satisfy. Then we claim that any can-didate subset with even one corrupted symbol must generate a set of inconsistent linear equations. Hence Bob decodes the unique candidate subset that generates a consistent set of linear equations. As we will see, the error probability of our scheme will be n 2 /q , which is o(1) if we set q = exp(poly(n)).
The details of d-DOODAD now follow. We define a connected component G i of an undirected graph G as a connected subgraph of G such that there is no edge in G between any vertex in G i and any vertex outside it. Also, let L be the linear transform of the Reed-Solomon code that takes the length- The d-DOODAD algorithm decodes Alice's message correctly with probability at least 1 − n 2 /q . Proof: Throughout we assume that Lemma 4.1 holds for all corresponding y i and y j (by the union bound this happens with probability at least 1 − n 2 /q ). Thus corrupted y i and uncorrupted y j are non-adjacent in G. We first prove that at least one C(K) with only uncorrupted symbols satisfies Steps 2 and 3. We examine the three conditions of Step 2. By the definition of mutual consistency any set with only uncorrupted symbols satisfies Step 2(c). Since Calvin can corrupt at most pn symbols, there must be some C(K) satisfying Step 2(b).
To prove that C(K) also satisfies Step 2(a), we observe the following. If Calvin does not corrupt at least dn consecutive symbols between two uncorrupted symbols y i and y j (say i < j), there must be a sequence of at most j − i + 1 uncorrupted symbols with indices i = k 0 ≤ k 1 ≤ k 2 ≤ . . . ≤ k j−i = j such that any two consecutive symbols in the sequence have indices that differ by less than dn. Then by the definition of G, both y i and y j must be in the same connected component of G.
But there are at most pn corrupted symbols, hence there are at most c = p/d disjoint sequences of nd consecutive corrupted symbols (and thus at most c components in C(K)).
Lastly, we show that any C(K) with only uncorrupted symbols and satisfying Step 2 must also satisfy Step 3. To see this, note that any such C(K) has at least (1 − p)n symbols from F q . Thus, by the definitions of m and C for Theorem 3, C(K) has at least (1 − p)n 5 ≥ Cn 5 uncorrupted sub-symbols over F q . Also, since C(K) comprises solely of uncorrupted symbols, w K = vK, hence for any I, w I = v I . But by the properties of erasure codes, L −1 I v I = u, Alice's message vector. Thus LK L −1 I w I = LKu = vK = w K. We now show that there does not exist any C(K ) such that the corresponding output of the d-DOODAD algorithm u(C(K )) differs from Alice's real message u. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose a C(K ) passes all the decoding steps of the d-DOODAD algorithm and results in a u(C(K )) distinct from Alice's message u. We now make a series of observations that successively refine the structure of such a C(K ), resulting in the conclusion that, w.h.p., C(K ) contains no uncorrupted symbols, and therefore u(C(K )) = u.
First, note that C(K ) must contain uncorrupted symbols to pass Step 2(b), since p < 1/2. In addition, to pass Step 2(c), by Lemma 4.1(i), all the uncorrupted symbols of C(K ) must come before all the symbols corrupted by Calvin. Now notice that the uncorrupted and the corrupted symbols in C(K ) must be separated by a separating set R of at least nd consecutive symbols not in C(K ). If not, Lemma 4.1(ii) would imply that w.h.p. C(K ) does not satisfy Step 2(c) of d-DOODAD. Now note that the separating set R must contain at least dn consecutive symbols corrupted by Calvin. This follows from the fact that C(K ) consists of connected components. Namely, if R contains less than dn corrupted symbols, there must exist an uncorrupted symbol y i and a corrupted symbol y j , both in C(K ), satisfying |j−i| < dn. But this by Lemma 4.1(ii) would contradict Step 2(c). Notice that if d > p we may conclude our proof at this point.
We now observe that there are at most (p − d)n corrupted symbols in C(K ). This follows from the fact that R contains dn consecutive symbols corrupted by Calvin (not in C(K )), and the fact that Calvin can corrupt at most pn symbols. This, together with Step 2(b) of d-DOODAD, implies that the component set C(K ) contains a proper subset C(K ) with at least Cn uncorrupted symbols. Finally, let I be any subset of Cn 5 uncorrupted sub-symbols in C(K ). Let I be any other subset of Cn 5 symbols in C(K ). Consider the corresponding message vectors u = L −1 I w I and u = L −1 I w I that
Step 3 of d-DOODAD may decode to. SinceK is of size at least (1 − p)n 5 , by the property of erasure codes [9] , if u = u, then LK u = LK u. Thus LK L −1 I w I = LK L −1 I w I = LK u = w K , contradicting Step 3.
Capacity
Minimum q Complexity Probability of Error Theorem 1 1 − 2p q > n O`n 2 log n log 3 q´0
Theorem 2 1 − p n Ω(1/δ 2 ) O`n 2 log n log 3 q´O " nq −δ 2 " Theorem 3 d < p < 0.5 1 − 2p + d n Ω(n 2 /δ 2 ) O`n p/d+2 log n log 3 q´O " n 2 q −δ 2 /n 2 " p < d, p < 0.5 1 − p n Ω(n 2 /δ 2 ) O`n 2 log n log 3 q´O " n 2 q −δ 2 /n 2 " 
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we characterize the capacity of online adversarial channels and their variants under the additive and overwrite error models. Our results are tight and coding schemes efficient.
Throughout, in our proofs, we have considered uniform encoders. Our lower bounds trivially extend to general encoders. For our upper bounds we must show that our waitand-attack scheme still implies a constant error probability for some message u. This is shown as follows by adding two modifications to the proof of the second and third case in the upper bound section in Theorem 3. Primarily, one cannot bound the size of S with high probability, rather one must bound the q-ary entropy of messages in the set S in a similar manner. Secondly, in our analysis of the decoding error we must consider the case in which Bob takes into consideration the distribution of Alice's messages while decoding. We stress, that in this case, our bound will apply only to maximum error probability. Specifically, in our analysis, on the pair of events in which Alice transmits x and Calvin chooses x and in which Alice transmits x and Calvin chooses x, no matter which decoding process Bob uses, at most one of x or x will be decoded correctly with probability greater than 1/2. If x is decoded correctly with probability greater than 1/2 we say that in the event in which Alice transmits x and Calvin chooses x the decoding is successful and Bob is a winner. However, this implies that in the event in which Alice transmits x and Calvin chooses x the decoding is not successful and Bob is a loser. Now, averaging over all pairs x and x in S it holds that Bob is a loser in at least half of the corresponding events. Hence, there exists a message u such that conditioned on the event in which Alice transmits a codeword x ∈ S corresponding to u and Calvin chooses x ∈ S, Bob is a loser with probability at least 1/2. Combining this fact in the proof flow of Theorem 3 implies that for u the decoding error is at least 1/4.
Throughout, we assume that the alphabet size is large compared to the block-length n. An intriguing problem left untouched in this work and addressed partially in [8] is the case of "small", e.g. binary, alphabets. The authentication schemes used extensively in this work depend integrally on the q being large. They do not extend naïvely to the binary alphabet case, where new techniques seem to be needed.
